1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily developed during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Faysal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the contrary, it was criticized by anti-Zionist enthusiasts, by ardent members of the pan-Arab Muthannā Club in Baghdad, and at times in Egypt and Syrian newspapers, as being less than whole-hearted on the question of Arab unity. Bakr Ṣidqi was a Kurd, Ḥikmat Sulayman by sympathy more Turk than Arab, and the Ahali group cared little for international politics. The tone of its early programme and of the speeches of Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman were equalitarian and easily labelled Communistic, and they alarmed the established classes. The Reformist group had indeed assumed its share of power with high hopes; but for all their newspaper and their 'People's Reform League', to which four ministers belonged, they found little popular support. They were opposed by the shaykhs who feared for their own positions, and thwarted by the Army who distrusted or despised them. The efforts of the group, laudable as they were as appreciating something of the real weaknesses and evils of 'Iraq society, were politically unprofitable to a Ministry dominated by the Army and by reaction. The freedom of the press and of politics promised for all, in contrast to Yasin's régime, ceased to be permitted as soon as opponents grew active. Political and tribal prisoners including the Yazidis were released and a general amnesty proclaimed; but not long afterwards measures of suppression were taken as severe as those of a year earlier. Meanwhile friends of Ja'far Pasha—and notably his brother-in-law, Nuri Sa'id, tirelessly manœuvring and writing from Egypt and Syria—would forgive neither the murder nor its perpetrators, nor the willingness of the King and the present Cabinet to leave it unpunished. And, with all these elements of criticism and discontent, those endemic on the middle Euphrates were still alive, and soon to burst into violent activity.

Nowhere indeed were the embarrassments of Ḥikmat's position clearer than in his attempts to solve the insoluble Euphrates problem. He must placate malcontents without offending their enemies: he must pardon the already condemned, but not show weakness: must keep order, but without a harshness which would be resented. Starting with all confidence in his own good intentions and diplomatic skill, he signally failed. The ferment of self-seeking and vengeful faction which was the normal life of Euphrates shaykhly and religious circles refused to cool at his bidding. A notorious land dispute among the Bani Zurayj of Samawa qadhā was the occasion to rally once again the forces supporting and opposed to 'Abd al-Waḥid al-Ḥajj Sikr and Muḥsin abu al-Ṭabikh. These flouted the orders of the Ministry to a point which made inevitable a return to the severity with which Ḥikmat Sulayman had hoped to dispense, the two inveterate trouble-makers were deprived of their parliamentary immunity, arrested, and sentenced to detention in

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

equivalent to first 15, later 25, and finally 35 per cent. of the Japanese imports. Russian competition, begun with formidable impetus in 1933, did not persist.

The transit trade with Persia, which by all indications had been under sentence of disappearance, survived though with a gradual loss of volume. It was aided by central and northern Persia's import of oil products, and by a small intake from the Levant across 'Iraq. Persian attempts to divert traffic from 'Iraqi routes, however, continued, and Muḥammara (now Khoramshahr) began to replace Baghdad as the financial centre of the trade.

The banking and financial background of internal business varied little, though an intention of closer Government control was shown by the law restricting certain occupations to 'Iraqis, by insistence on security deposits from foreign insurance companies, by the expressed willingness of Government to participate directly in industry and, early in 1938, by a law for the control of banking. The currency was well maintained on its sterling parity, the Board in London contributing an annual profit to the 'Iraq Treasury. The handling, transport, and distribution of merchandise was in some degree modernized; shops and hotels of European pattern multiplied, not in Baghdad alone, with Jews and Christians still prominent in these activities. Features of the period, which helped to bridge the 'Iraq of the 'twenties to that of the mid-century, were the beginnings of new suburbs, the modern villas, the many private cars, and the rudimentary bus services of the principal cities. They served a public in which the townsmen had in hundreds renounced Arab dress for European, had often doffed the characteristic 'Iraqi *sidara* in favour of a hat or bare head, and could walk out with ladies among whom the veil was no longer universal.

Local industry advanced but slowly. To the enterprises mentioned on earlier pages (p. 210) the years from 1932 to 1937 had little to add. One or two of the small textile factories were enlarged with German machinery and Czech operators; more small cigarette factories and more mechanized brick kilns were established, one-room ice and soda factories multiplied, a third cotton ginnery was planned for the Kut area, and enterprises for the making of confectionery and matches came into humble existence. Yasin Pasha's cement project, in spite of a visit by German experts, failed to materialize, and another cement scheme, in which an English promoter was active, inspired no confidence.

In oil development, on the other hand, these years were highly significant. The 'Iraq Petroleum and the B.O.D. Companies (p. 211) made annual dead-rent payments to a combined total of more than half a million pounds yearly until 1935, and thereafter the I.P.C. royalties alone doubled this amount. After a ceremonial

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

241 473 types, and low yield depressing to the ambitious farmer. The Baṣra date industry, in which British and American packers and exporters had a dominant share, made its divisions yet more explicit in 1933 by the appearance of rival organizations within it: the Government-approved Date Growers Association on the one side, and an association of date packers on the other. The clash of interest and tactics between these two, both fully representative of their respective interests, resulted in disastrous conditions in the industry and led in 1935, after a visit to Baṣra by Yasin Pasha, to the passage of a law establishing a Date Board with representatives of all Baṣra date interests and its own direction and revenues derived from a small export tax; it effected for a time a marked improvement in growing, packing, and exporting conditions. A Committee was set up in 1933 to investigate beet-sugar production, and found reason for hopefulness. The first suggestions were heard of a monopoly for the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products, and meanwhile something was done to improve the drying, cutting, and packing of the Kurdish leaf. 'Iraqi cotton, the object of high hopes ten years before, passed through a depressed period. The crop climbed slowly to 5,000 bales by 1928, only to drop almost to nothing and to recover to 3,000 bales in 1934. Thereafter substantial yearly increases appeared, and by 1938 15,000 bales were produced. Among the cotton-growers was the Laṭifiya Company (p. 213), an enterprise which, however, found itself early in its career in serious difficulties. It failed in its undertaking to repay the cost of its canal to Government, and in 1935 control was assumed by Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co.; thereafter, with fresh finance and a revision of its agreement with Government, the progressive agricultural work of the estate could proceed. It was to remain under single and personal British management for the next twenty years. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was unable, in its early years, to do much for the public.

[656]

241 312 [45] [185] Pump irrigation, which the economic crisis of 1929–31 and the prevailing low prices involved in widespread losses and stoppages, recovered gradually after 1933 and stabilized itself as a main feature of 'Iraqi production. It had introduced, for better or worse, a new element into local agriculture—the urban capitalist; and it helped thus to lead part of the wealthier class to a fresh interest in rural affairs and modern forms of land development. In flow irrigation the period—the first in which surplus State funds became modestly available, thanks to oil royalties—was one of progress. The first stage of the forty-mile Abu Ghurayb canal, from the Euphrates left bank below Ramadi, was completed in 1936 with a considerable commanded acreage. The Mishkhab regulator, low down on the Kufa channel of the Euphrates, was built in 1936. A canal deriving

312 653

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

665 668 The opening of Parliament on 1 November heralded a period of political strife in which some opposition speakers were hot in protest against the Baṣra concession, others—Rashid 'Ālī and Ḥikmat Sulayman prominent among them—revived the bitter controversies of the last three years, and others found pretexts to revile the Government for its suspension of suspect officials, and for the suppression of demonstrations and seditious newspapers to which it had been unwillingly driven. When, late in November, an outbreak of bomb-throwing in Baghdad was attributed (probably with justice) to anti-Government agitators, the Cabinet had recourse to the Seditious Propaganda Law passed earlier but not hitherto invoked, and under its terms banished to remote townships a number of their more violent opponents. These included officers known for their loyalty to Bakr Ṣidqi, prominent lawyers, and politicians of ministerial pretension; and the impending crisis drew nearer when the outspoken provocations of Rashid 'Ālī led to his arrest and dispatch to 'Ana. The friends of these exiles lost no time in approaching other like-thinking malcontents on the one side, and Army chiefs on the other. Among the latter, the group later to be known as the Golden Square was already formed, resolute and ruthless. It consisted of Ṣalaḥ al-Din Ṣabbagh, commanding the 3rd Division stationed in and around the capital, Kamil Shabib, commanding the 1st Division, Maḥmud Salman, head of the 'Iraq Air Force, and Fahmi Sa'id, in charge of mechanized forces. These leaders were indignant at their subordination to a parvenu as Minister of Defence, and at recent promotions and dismissals little to their taste. They professed loyalty to their old Chief of Staff, Ṭaha al-Hashimi, carried with them the present Chief of Staff, Ḥusayn Fawzi, and other senior officers in an approach to Ṭaha—not without the knowledge of Nuri Pasha—and demanded a change of Government. Next, gathered at al-Rashid Camp, they dispatched a petition to the King requesting the formation of a Ministry under Ṭaha himself or under Nuri, and repeated the demand insistently to the President of the Royal Diwan, Rashid al-Khawja, whom King Ghazi sent to interview them. They had in the meanwhile stood their troops to arms, occupied key points in the city, and posted guards at the houses of Nuri and Ṭaha, fearing or pretending to fear their arrest and banishment. The case was simultaneously placed before the Prime Minister by a senior military spokesman, who indicated that neither civilians nor the Police were concerned in the movement. Satisfied after an interview with Nuri that order would be maintained, Madfa'i urged the generals to return to their proper duties, and himself, after a Cabinet meeting, resigned his office by letter to the King. Nuri Pasha, perhaps with the reluctance which he

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Politics and war-attitude apart, conditions in the territory throughout 1940 were as secure and tolerable as could be hoped. A number of offenders sentenced by the courts martial of previous régimes were liberated, the State of Emergency at al-Rashid camp, in force since March 1939, was brought to an end. Ṣubiḥ Najib was pardoned and released. The Ministry, to whom in some circles the revered Gaylani name was an asset, declared war on immorality, shut places of evil entertainment or drunkenness, and ostentatiously improved Waqf buildings. The foundation stone of the Faysal Mosque was laid. Observance of the Ramadhan fast was enforced by the daytime closing of restaurants. The completion of the Baiji–Mosul section of the railway, with its long tunnel, permitted at last a direct Baghdad–Istanbul service, though rolling stock available for use was of the scantiest. Work at the Ḥabbaniya reservoir was pressed forward. Oil production was normal again since the month-long interruption in September 1939, and both pipelines remained in use until the stoppage of pumping, on the Tripoli branch into Vichy–French territory, in July 1940. The sowings of cotton were much increased, and 25,000 bales produced. The Government tobacco monopoly was brought into effect, to the chagrin of many Kurdish growers whose freedom of disposal it curtailed. Agriculture was everywhere encouraged with a view to full national self-sufficiency, though the disastrous spring floods were a reminder of its precariousness.

Commercial and industrial life strove to maintain normality, or even progress. An ambitious Co-operative Society to produce fruit preserves was founded. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was busy with loans to cultivators, and with the sale and servicing of agricultural machinery; it advanced money also to a new ginnery at 'Aziziya, took shares in the 'Iraq Cement Company, and helped a vegetable-oil extraction plant. Work proceeded on the Baghdad automatic telephone installation. The budget for 1940–1, which allotted a third of all revenues to the Army, found room for the cost of completing the irrigation work on the Abu Ghurayb, and for the Ḥawija project, the Diyalā weir, the Shamiya river improvement, and the 'bunds' around Baghdad. The credit allowed by the banks and *ṣarrafs* was extended or restricted according to the war news, market prices rose and fell, Government's control in the economic field was discreet and indeed largely inoperative. Shortage of shipping and transport vehicles were a serious hindrance to the export trade, whether conveyed by sea or by the land routes. A Turkish mission visited Baṣra with the hope of securing a southern gateway of entry for their country. The loss of French purchases of 'Iraqi wool was severely felt; trade with Japan on the contrary seemed likely to develop fast.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqis, recruited by the Palestine Defence League, entered Palestine and served or offered to serve with Fawzi al-Qawuqchi and the Palestine leaders; they were inspired perhaps by genuine devotion but were of negligible fighting capacity. The inefficacy of this force, and the collapse of Arab resistance in the face of Jewish terrorism and their resolute forces, led the League to decide, before the official end of the Mandate, upon the intervention of Arab regular armies. In April the Regent, whose leadership and vitality regained him much of his popularity, visited 'Amman and Cairo with the Ministers of Defence, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. Student hunger strikes were called in Baghdad to urge the dispatch of the Army to Palestine, the closure of the Haifa pipeline, and a welcome for the Palestine exiles; and the Government of al-Ṣadr saw no alternative to following the League policy of large-scale intervention, however sketchily co-ordinated. 'Iraqi forces under General Ṣaliḥ Ṣa'ib—forces ill prepared, ill equipped, and with clearly inadequate supplies and reserves—moved from their home stations some ten to twelve thousand strong in mechanized or lorry-borne units, and took up positions on the western fringes of the Jordan Kingdom. They crossed into their allotted sector of Palestine on 15 May, immediately after the State of Israel had been proclaimed.

The outbreak of this war—the first occasion upon which its troops were used abroad—was the signal for the imposition of martial law throughout 'Iraq: a step happy only in its immediate restoration of outward tranquillity, but indicative of no real solution of any of the nation's problems. The emergency régime, which facilitated Government control over the elections, was marked by strict censorship, the opening of a concentration camp in the southern desert for the many arrested trouble-makers, the subordination of civil to military officials in all areas, and the establishment of military courts. It prohibited the carrying of firearms and the use of cypher codes, and by the supersession of many existing laws it involved a close restriction of civil rights. The clash between civil and military authorities increased as weeks went by with irritation, jealousy, and charges and counter-charges of indiscriminate severity or weak indulgence: Mutaṣarrifs and Qa'immaqams were soon heard to ask 'Which is the worse, government by students or by Army officers?' The press, swollen to an extraordinary number of daily sheets of trifling circulation but irresponsible violence, lost in a day the worst of its venom (except such as could be safely directed against the British or the Jews), and the few papers which refused compliance were suppressed. A ceremonial parade of the police in Baghdad did something to restore their morale. The Palestine war aroused enthusiastic

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

alone, were for abandoning Palestine altogether. The formation of an Assyrian Brigade, initiated by the Regent and actively in hand late in 1948, was frustrated by the jealousies and fears of Arab nationalists. The policy of the Pachachi Cabinet was to keep troops in Palestine, to reject (but conform to) the second truce, to refuse all negotiations with Israel, and to blame the British Government for ceasing to supply arms. They spurned the Bernadotte proposals for partition and peace, recognized the Mufti's Government while standing solid with King 'Abdullah who scornfully rejected it—and waited month after month for they knew not what.

If fair security was maintained at home during these months it was by reason of the continuation of martial law. Within this régime, of which the termination was viewed with alarm, the disturbing hostilities between civil and military authorities continued, and it became necessary to restrict the military courts, each one a battle-ground between the forces of the Mutaṣarrif and the local general, first to a limited class of case—those concerned with Palestine and with Communism—and then to a single tribunal in Baghdad. Communism played its part in every strike and street demonstration, and had friends in the public services and in the Army; the severities of 1947 had left vigorous life in its underground organization, which further arrests late in 1948 and the seizure of an illegal press still left formidable. The effective alliance between Kurdish nationalism and Russo-Kurdish Communism, which helped to transfer the leadership of Kurdish separatism from the Aghās to the intelligentsia, led during 1948 to endless disorders in the streets and schools of Sulaymaniya with an uneasy succession of arrests, releases, and rearrests. The infiltration of propaganda from Persian and Russian soil continued, and the newspaper *Azadi* still circulated. Elsewhere in 'Iraq the tribes were quiet.

Town security improved in spite of minor election rioting, with student and sometimes hooligan demonstrations on any pretext repeated *ad nauseam*. An increase of hostile pressure on the Baghdad Jews, in spite of their centuries of 'Iraqi citizenship and their anti-Zionism, was in these conditions psychologically inevitable; in the autumn of 1949 arrests of Jews included that of a whole assembly in the 'Amara synagogue, and protests from Israel at these and at alleged detentions in concentration camps reached the United Nations. The connexion between Zionism and Communism was taken for granted by popular outcry; Jew and Zionist were identified; and the sight of the terrified community, declared to be selling 'Iraqi military secrets to Palestine, aroused in some the worst instincts of spite and bullying. But more intelligent and more chivalrous attitudes were not lacking, and a number of

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

439 457 skins. Not all the dollar income accrues to Iraq, however, partly because invoices are regularly undervalued and also because some commodities are sold through intermediaries in the Lebanon.

439 **Other Products.** In the years 1947 to 1949 the remaining exports consisted of the following: bricks and sand exported for use by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the value of about ID 300,000 a year; a variety of agricultural products, whose total value did not exceed ID 500,000 in any one year; and cotton. Iraq has always exported a little cotton, but in the best years, just before the war and again in 1950, its value was only about five percent [248] of all export receipts. The position is now changing radically. Iraq, like several neighboring countries, is experiencing a cotton boom. Under the stimulus of high prices, the area under cultivation has increased rapidly in the last few years and predictions for the 1951 crop have ranged as high as 150,000 tons of seed-cotton, compared with 25,000 tons the year before. If the fellah's traditional aversion to a crop he cannot consume himself has been permanently overcome and if he can acquire the necessary knowledge for good cultivation, cotton could very soon become one of Iraq's most important exports, if not the most important. As a summer crop, however, its cultivation will be hazardous until the control of the rivers gives better assurance of a summer water supply.

Import Policy

439 456 457 All foreign transactions are, with certain exceptions, subject to exchange control. Imports from hard currency areas have been governed by licensing systems and have been limited to goods such as agricultural and industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks and drugs. Before 1948, imports from other areas were not subject to license, except for about 100 items, mainly luxuries. In that year, however, Iraq experienced a very large drain on her foreign exchange reserves and a more complex system was introduced.

Under the system now in force, all imported goods have been placed on one of several lists, the two longest consisting of "unlimited" and "limited" goods. Each merchant is given an annual quota in dinars, within which he can import unlimited goods without restriction, provided he obtains a license for each purchase. Alternatively, he can spend a small part of his quota on "limited" goods, but only up to a fixed amount.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

Unlimited goods consist mainly of the goods purchased by the common people such as tea, sugar and cotton textiles, and a variety of other goods considered essential, such as drugs and medical equipment, educational matter, industrial, electrical and agricultural machinery, transport equipment and raw materials for local industries such as gunny bags, certain vegetable oils, *mastika* (for *arak*), tanning extracts and non-ferrous metals. The principal object of the system, when it was introduced, was to prevent a shortage of these necessities—and hence high prices—at a time when imports as a whole had to be restricted to protect the country's exchange reserves. As an additional safeguard, each application for an import license was scrutinized to insure that the articles being purchased were not too highly priced. Since Iraq's foreign exchange position greatly improved in 1950, the import of unlimited goods is now permitted without any quota limitation.

The goods on the limited list, while not strictly luxuries, consist of goods considered less essential than those in the unlimited list. This includes, for example, ready-made clothing of various kinds, automobiles, matches, and certain types of household utensils and electric ware. Luxuries, such as bananas, confectionery, cosmetics, Persian rugs and nylon stockings, were placed on a third list of goods "without foreign exchange." These goods could be purchased only by merchants who held a special license to import "without foreign exchange," which meant that they had to acquire foreign exchange through other than the official channels. Such licenses also permitted them to purchase goods on the other two lists.

Foreign exchange can be acquired without official license in a number of ways, of which the following are probably the most important: by undervaluation of exports, especially wool, hides and skins; by the export of dates to neighboring countries in small craft (in this case retention of foreign exchange is legally permitted); by smuggling, although there is probably a net inflow of smuggled goods; by sale of dinar notes to foreign pilgrims to the Holy Cities; and by overvaluation of imports. The present system was introduced in order to compel merchants to use these resources instead of drawing on the national exchange reserves. Although the system has been successful in that there has been a very

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

439 extensive use of private exchange holdings, particularly in 1949
456 when licenses to the value of over ID 10,000,000 were issued, it
457 may well be that it has also encouraged the illegal acquisition of foreign exchange.

A fourth list consists of prohibited goods. This is purely a protective device, almost all of the goods in this list being produced in Iraq. These include a variety of agricultural products such as sesame seeds and cottonseed or their oils. Several of the newer industries have also been protected by the prohibition of their products, for example, beer, cement, cotton yarn, aluminum ware, alcohol and hides.

Although the improvement in the foreign exchange situation has led to a relaxation of the quota limitation, the other restrictions remain. In particular, import licenses still have to be obtained for each purchase. Although it is maintained that licenses can now be obtained quickly, this appears to act as at least a psychological deterrent to merchants. One of the objects of the licensing system is to restrict importing to bona fide merchants, but if this is considered necessary, it could, of course, be achieved by the issue of a general importer's license, good for a period such as a year.

439 As the economy develops and the standard of living rises,
456 which it may do rapidly in the near future, the demand for goods now on the limited and prohibited lists is likely to increase and restrictions on imports of these goods might easily have an inflationary effect on prices. This would hit the artisan, the clerk and the civil servant, and might increase the cost of the development program. Any extension of prohibition to textiles and other goods produced in Iraq would, of course, hurt the poorest classes. Under these circumstances, it will be very difficult to manage so rigid a system.

A much more flexible instrument would be the customs tariff, but little coordination of the import licensing system with the tariff
[451] seems to have been achieved. At present the tariff is primarily a means for raising revenue and, as such, imposes the greatest burden on those who buy bulk commodities. It hardly conforms to the objectives of a licensing system that aims at a plentiful supply of these goods at low prices. The principal objection put forward to higher duties on luxuries is the increased premium

7: International Bank N. S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

thereby put on smuggling which is difficult to control in a country with long land frontiers, even with a large police force. On the other hand, smuggled goods can now be purchased quite openly, and it is hard to believe that enforcement could not be made more effective.

In any event, outright restriction of imports could cause prices to rise and so put almost as great a premium on smuggling as a high tariff. The government has tried to prevent excessive mark-ups on certain goods such as radios by price control measures, but the control is by no means fully effective.

The government has also supplemented the system by entering the market itself. For example, arrangements have been made under the recent Trade Agreement with India for the import of cotton textiles and gunny bags, in part on government account. The government has also made direct purchases from abroad of its own requirements (e.g. tires). The effect has, however, not always been as intended, merchants being hesitant to buy with the prospect of large government stocks hanging over the market.

On the whole, a less complex system of import control would seem better suited to an economy like that of Iraq, whose requirements are likely to change in composition and to increase quite rapidly. Fewer regulations, more strictly enforced, are likely to serve better the two ends of social justice and public revenue.

Balance of Payments

The bulk of foreign transactions are carried out through the commercial banks, which are subject to exchange controls, or through government channels such as the National Bank. However, numerous transactions pass through other channels and many of them are virtually impossible to estimate. For this reason the Mission has not attempted to construct a true balance of payments. Table 14 shows the foreign exchange transactions passing through the principal official channels, so far as they are known to the Mission. The other items which would enter into a complete balance of payments are discussed subsequently.

As will be seen, even this account, which it should ordinarily be possible to balance, is subject to a wide margin of error for which no explanation is available. The general significance of the

44 Wilson G-3 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Kurd MA11

Air Force. The terrain was exceedingly mountainous and thickly wooded and there were many caves in which to shelter from bombs or machine-gunning from the air. The Shaikh's followers, too, were very hardy and mobile. Without very efficient air action, which aimed at destroying the morale of the Kurds by perpetually harassing them rather than by slaying them, to gain a definite result would have been a very costly affair. As it was the Shaikh and his followers were eventually driven into Turkey and after surrendering to the Turkish authorities were handed over to the 'Iraq Government. It was found that the Shaikh, his brothers and the remnants of the standing army could not fit in with any regular administration, and so they have been settled in small bodies in southern Kurdistan near Sulimani, where they will not be in a position to cause further trouble. The Barzanis have now reverted to the Islamic faith.

Roads

What has really tamed the Kurds is the Government policy of making roads through the mountains, just as General Wade did in Scotland with similar results. Good roads now exist from Arbil, where Alexander the Great defeated King Darius III. in 331 B.C., to the Persian frontier at Rayat and from Dohuq to Amadia. Both these roads represent considerable engineering feats and carry a good volume of traffic. The Rowanduz road was that which a nomadic Kurdish tribe, the Herki, with their 60,000 animals, used on their annual migrations from 'Iraq to their summer grazing grounds in Iran. During recent years difficulties arose between the nomads and the 'Irani Government, and the former now remain in 'Iraq for the summer. It has not been easy to find grazing for them there, as other nomadic tribes had already been forbidden by the Turkish Government to graze in Turkey and had occupied practically all the spare grazing. The 'Iraq Government, too, has been attempting to popularize summer resorts in Kurdistan and so prevent the flow of money to Syria and the Lebanon, where good summer amenities exist. I am afraid, however, that so far this policy has not been very successful. Good summer resorts require the expenditure of much money, and the attempts at providing suitable summer accommodation have, I regret, tended to spoil what was originally beautiful scenery.

The little town of Zakho in western Kurdistan has greatly benefited by the improvement in public security and communications and is

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

654 of products.[1] Financial assistance thus provided by the Government,
653 together with the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry issued in 1950, proved of great potency in the development of industry. The capital of the Industrial Bank was increased in 1952, to I.D. 3,000,000 of which I.D. 1,200,000 have already been paid up.
433 These and other measures, such as increases in custom duties
656 and the restriction or prohibition of certain industrial imports, have produced marked progress in the establishment of new industries and the re-equipment and expansion of old ones, especially since the end of World War II.[2] This can be seen from the following table:

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Development of Large-Scale Industry in Iraq 1948 - 1952

Year (1st April - 31st March)	Capital Invested I.D. 1000	Value of Annual Output I.D. 1000	Number of Employees	Wages paid annually I.D. 1000
(Seven large Industries)				
1948 - 49	3,183	1,403	1649	
1949 - 50	3,194	1,555	2626	333
1950 - 51	4,296	2,631	3443	486
1951 - 52	4,415	3,600	3837	486
(Ten large Industries)[3] 1951 - 52	4,835	4,424	4533	599

1 Industrial Bank, Compilation of Laws, Regulations, etc. Government Press, Baghdad 1951.

2 For pre-World War II industrial development in Iraq see: *A Handbook of Mesopotamia*, H.M.S.O., 1917. *A Report on the Progress of Iraq*, by H.M. Government to the League of Nations. H.M.S.O., 1931. *The Iraq Directory*, Baghdad, 1935 (English Edition). *The Economic Organization of Iraq* (in Arabic), Editor Said B. Himadeh, Beirut, 1937.

3 See the *Annual Report of the Department of Industry 1951-52*, Ministry of National Economy, Baghdad. (In Arabic)
The Report of the National Bank of Iraq, 1949-50, p. 46 (in Arabic) states that national production of cement, beer, vegetable oil, soap, leather.., etc., has been substituted for similar imports with the result that value of imports fell from I.D. 2,984,000 in 1948 to I.D. 1,298,000 in 1950, and the deficit in the balance of trade was reduced by I.D. 1,686,000 due to this reason alone during the same period.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHl Iraq MHl

464 production side, is quite common. Often foreign managers are
472 employed as experts on the basis of a monthly or annual salary,
473 sometimes with a commission in the form of a percentage of net profits. In one case at least production management is given to an independent foreign firm of engineers against a fixed annual payment. This so-called "managing agency system" has been recently introduced in Iraq and has not given rise to any complaints yet. The "system" however has resulted in many abuses in India where it is widely used, and it is now under investigation in that country.[1]

648 6. **Foreign Capital and Participation**: Except where foreign enter-
457 prise has obtained a concession for the development of important
471 resources such as oil, or the supply of light and power as in the Baghdad area, there is very little foreign capital invested in industry as such. Foreign capital for reasons beyond the scope of our discussion has been invested in Iraq mainly in trade and commercial banking (short-term lending). It may be to the benefit of Iraq to induce foreign capital, and perhaps management, to participate in industry. One of the best ways to get the advantage of foreign technical skill and experience, and to bridge the gulf between the existing state of technique in Iraq and that attained by highly organised industry abroad, is to encourage foreign firms to establish branch factories in Iraq. Such branches would have their own capital and management in which Iraqi nationals and foreigners could join together on an agreed basis. It is possible that the limitation of market and geographical position may discourage foreign firms from taking this course. Some of them would require special concessions to induce them to come to Iraq. Many of them are perhaps ignorant of the possibilities that exist. And many others may require some guarantees as to: (a) the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital, (b) equal treatment with Iraqi capital and industry, (c) in case of nationalisation, fair and equitable compensation. In all these respects Iraqi practice in the past has been quite generous, but there is no legislation which clearly defines government policy toward foreign enterprise. The Law for the Encouragement of Industry (1950) stipulates that 55 per cent of the capital should be owned by Iraqi

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[1] *The First Five Year Plan, Draft Plan.* Government of India, Planning Commission, July 1951, p. 161.

5:al Dalli S-5 (no date)1954 MHI Iraq MHI

nationals in order that industry may qualify for the concessions granted by that law. This may appear as a discrimination against foreign capital and some foreign industrialists have raised this point. But considering the great concessions granted by the Law, including the appropriation of state land, and the smallness of the majority reserved for nationals, the "discrimination" is nominal. Past experience of foreign capital investment in the Middle East does not allow the removal of such safeguards. However, the writer believes that proper legislation on these three points mentioned above would give foreign industrialists sufficient assurance; and, given the proper information and contacts, many firms may be induced to establish branches in Iraq to the benefit of all concerned.[1]

7. **Other problems**: There are other less important industrial problems which should be mentioned even though limitations of space prevent full discussion of them.

(a) It should be realized that Iraqi industry labours under a heavy burden of over-capitalization which adds to its costs. There is a tendency to have completely integrated plants; most industries have to maintain a power generating plant either to provide electricity, or as a spare in case of failure in the city supply. Practically all industries have their own workshops. There is a strong desire on the part of all industry owners to be self-sufficient with regard to supply of materials, chemicals and spare parts. Many industries have been induced to purchase more land than they actually need in order to guard against future needs and also to profit from the expected rise in land values. This has led to an insufficient utilization of machinery and to a great amount of working capital, per unit of production, locked up. These facts are reflected in the balance sheets of many industries in the form of Loans from Banks (commercial banks) which in some cases reach 50 per cent of nominal capital and thus increase the fixed charges which industry has to meet. The reason for this desire on the part of industrials to be more or less completely self-sufficient lies in the fact that, owing to the country's industrial immaturity, it is often impossible to rely on efficient service from outside plants when required. The need to keep great stores of

[1] In accordance with the economic boycott enforced by Arab States, firms having business relations with Israel are excluded.

652 473 ly control the price, sales and purchases policies of such industries. In the first place, though the Bank holds a large proportion of the capital (varying between 20 and 40 per cent) of every industry, it is always in the minority on the Boards of Directors; moreover it appoints its own representatives and is excluded from taking part in the election of other directors by the articles of association of the companies concerned. This course has been deliberately taken so as to ensure private enterprise against arbitrary action on the part of the government. Secondly, the Bank itself is, in the last analysis, a profit seeking institution and therefore it is not likely to stand in the way of any measures likely to increase profits, unless they are of an obviously oppressive or abusive nature. Thirdly, the main duty of the Bank is to promote industry. Promotion and control are not always compatible.

656 475 For these reasons the State has to look for other ways, and to use more fully the legal powers which it already possesses, for effective control over industry. The fact that it owns a share in industry through the Industrial Bank puts it in a better position to exercise such control. But to rely mainly on the Industrial Bank for this purpose is to escape responsibility.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MH1 Iraq MH1

and 286 in the period 1904 to 1914.[1] In Egypt and in the United States, the Arabic press,[2] with a wide circulation even in the Ottoman Empire,[3] was a powerful agent, by its constant and bitter denunciation of the Turks, in arousing Nationalist sentiment among Arab peoples.[4]

In 'Iraq, no less than in Syria and Arabia, the 'Ottomanizing' policy of the Young Turks stimulated the Nationalist Movement. It continued, however, to lag behind the Movement across the desert, even as it had been slower to develop. Cut off by its geographical position and by its lack of communication from the West, 'Iraq lay torpid, a potentially rich Turkish Siberia but lacking educational facilities and the stimulus of new ideas and of political thought such as prevailed along the Mediterranean coast. Conservative in thought, the Sunnī Muslims were slow to withdraw their political allegiance from the Sultan whom both religion and tradition had established as their religious head.[5] The Shī'a priesthood, Persian for the most part, hated the Osmanlis both as Sunnīs and as oppressors, but possessed little community of interest with the Arabs, although Arabs of the Shī'a sect formed a majority of the population of 'Iraq.

The social structure, based fundamentally on the soil, and not far removed from feudalism, was stony ground for Nationalism. Landlords sought only relief from taxation. Shaikhs desired individual freedom for themselves and their tribes. Merchants, principally Jews, perhaps the most progressive single element in the land, had little deep feeling for either

[1] The life of a journal during the Turkish regime was often not long, particularly if in opposition to the Government. Suppressed journals frequently reappeared under new names.

[2] From 1904 to 1914, 385 Arabic newspapers and magazines were founded in Egypt, North and South America: Tarazi, op. cit.

[3] Although banned from Turkey, they were distributed through the foreign post offices.

[4] Djemal Pasha, in particular, resented the part played by the Arabic Press abroad: Turkish Red Book, *La Vérité sur la Question Syrienne*, pp. 12-13.

[5] *Infra*, p. 235, for typical view on the sanctity of the Ottoman regime.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

where the electoral body is not so amenable to control as elsewhere, the confidential orders of the Government to the provincial officials proved sufficient to secure the election of its candidates whether they were residents of the district or even known there. Thus in 1925, all but four of the government candidates were returned, two of these being from Baghdad *Liwā*.[1] In 1928 the deputies returned from Basra, 'Amāra, Diyālā, Dulaim, Hilla and 'Arbīl *Liwās* were government nominees.[2] Of the thirteen Baghdad deputies, all but five were Government candidates. In these two elections, as well as in that of 1930, a number of Opposition candidates were conscientiously included by the Government on the principle advocated by the King that talented members of the Opposition would raise more difficulties outside Parliament from feelings of personal dissatisfaction than if they were actually members. Thus in 1928, half of the twenty-two Opposition members returned to the Chamber had been previously given the government coupon.

The deputies, on the other hand, by their proneness to consider parliamentary office as a means to personal aggrandisement, persistently refused the opportunity to win the respect and confidence of the nation. In 1925, it had been somewhat difficult to secure candidates to come forward. It soon became apparent, however, that deputyship meant an assured income and, even more attractive, the exercise of influence. In 'Iraq, as in other countries, the principal value attached to official position has been its effectiveness in securing official favours and financial gain.

Examination of the statute books of 'Iraq, not only from 1925 to 1932 but also to the present date, seems to suggest that the deputies have not failed to make free use of their position. Many of the financial measures granting remission of arrears in

[1] *Baghdad Times*, June 10th, 1925. These four, with five others, were, according to a confidential report of the time, accounted to be 'unsatisfactory from the British standpoint'.

[2] Cf. *Baghdad Times*, May 10th, 1928.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

revenue[1] and of other financial legislation,[2] while passed by the Chamber for the benefit of 'Iraq as a whole, particularly after the agricultural crisis of 1931, have especially favoured the land-owning class which has been predominant in Parliament. Other evidence seems to point to the exercise by the deputies of their influence outside of Parliament, either to secure preferential treatment from revenue officials or to obtain appointments for their protégés.

In spite of these deficiencies, Parliament, judged by its complete record before 1932 as well as afterwards, has filled an important function in the political life of 'Iraq. It has attracted the most agile brains in the country; it has reflected although imperfectly, public opinion; and it has served as a brake on legislation which might otherwise have been forced on the country more quickly than it could be assimilated. It has served to curb the attempts of individual Ministers to assume a dictatorial attitude. Its right of interrogation, while sometimes checking the initiative of Ministers, has also served to reveal irregularities in administration. It has, moreover, furnished an outlet for Shī'a aspirations for participation in the Government and has given tribal opinion a limited means of expression through the tribal representatives, although discontent with the number of tribal representatives and the manner of their election was given by the leaders of the tribal revolt of 1935 as one of the primary reasons for that rising.[3]

The Chamber, together with the conservative Senate of twenty appointed notables, has, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, laid the foundations upon which democratic government, if it is to come to 'Iraq, must be built. If Parliament were to be given a broader base of an enlightened electorate, a reasonable degree of freedom of election, leadership and new

[1] Particularly Laws: No. 38 of 1927; No. 55 of 1929; Nos. 38, 43, 69 of 1931; Nos. 1, 5, 10, 34, 35 of 1932; Nos. 8, 10, 13, 14 of 1933.

[2] Particularly Pump Law of February 13th, 1926; No. 72 of 1926; No. 38 of 1929; No. 37 of 1930; No. 66 of 1931, etc.

[3] *Near East and India*, June 27th, 1935; also *The Times*, August 5th, 1936.

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

discrimination in accordance with capacity. Finally, Article 37 states that the method of election to the Chamber of Deputies shall take into account the necessity for the representation of non-Islamic minorities.

Some of these guarantees have been reinforced by particular laws. Thus the Electoral Law of 1924 allotted four deputies to the Christians and four to the Jews; it is a matter for dispute whether the law permits individual Christians and Jews to be elected as representatives of the ordinary constituencies. Similarly the non-Moslem communities were given representation in local and municipal councils by special laws.

As for the linguistic minorities, the Local Languages Law of 1931 provided that the official language should be Kurdish or Turkish in a number of districts, and in addition that in all elementary and primary schools in those districts the language of instruction should be the mother-tongue of the majority of the pupils.

Personal Status and Communal Organization

The grant to religious minorities of jurisdiction in personal and other matters has not met with the same difficulties as those which have occurred in Syria. Articles 75 and 78 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of Christian and Jewish Spiritual Councils, with powers of jurisdiction to be conferred upon them by special laws. Their functions were defined in Article 79 as including matters relating to marriage, dowry, divorce, separation, alimony, attestation of wills and any other matters relating to personal status if the parties concerned consented. Every religious community was also, according to Article 112, to have the right to establish bodies competent to administer Waqf property.

In application of these provisions, several laws have been issued for particular communities, defining the method of appointment of the spiritual heads of the communities and of their councils, both spiritual and lay, and their functions in regard not only to personal status but also the decision of religious questions, the training of ecclesiastics, the administration of Waqf property, and the administration of schools and charitable institutions. For those communities for which special laws have not yet been issued, the old Turkish law on the subject remains valid.

25: Wardnet S-5 (10) date 1948 MI Middle East
Iraq MH1

landowners, and the occupying peasants, which has from time to time led to outbreaks of violence.

In the Amara liwa for instance the sheikh has fairly complete power over his tribal sirkals and fellaheen. 'He switches his secondary lessees around at the yearly leasing time, throwing out any one he disapproves of, allotting the portions of land either by a form of auction or by direct agreement. The power of the sheikhs varies with the prosperity of the estates. The poor estates in the liwa, for instance, the Beni Lam estates, are short of labour and the sheikh is glad to get any comer on almost any terms. In such estates, the pump-owning secondary lessees (or sirkals) become the real masters of the land they cultivate, and the sheikh becomes a rent receiver. Other poorer estates in this district are becoming the property of the big rice merchants of the towns.'[1]

A report from the Muntafiq liwa describes similar conditions. The land is being ruined by bad farming, because year after year the same land is sown with a winter corn crop, and gets no rest either through fallow or through a rotation of crops. The government regulation that land must remain fallow in alternate years is disregarded. 'Perhaps the greatest racket in this area is the undue amount of the crop taken by pump owners,' says the report. This is due to the lack of any credit system: much forward selling of the crops takes place as soon as the green appears, at ruinous prices to the cultivator, sometimes in return for a loan amounting to about a quarter of the current grain price.[2]

In the densely settled regions of the south, such as Muntafiq, the position of the cultivator is particularly bad. He usually receives only a 30 to 50 per cent share of the produce. A typical apportionment of the crop is:

Government	10 per cent
Principal tenant (sheikh)	7½
Sirkal	2½
Landowner (either the sheikh or a notable)	40
Fellah	40
TOTAL	100[3]

[1] ibid.

[2] From an unpublished report prepared for M.E.S.C. on 'Land tenure in Muntafiq Liwa', 1944.

[3] A. Bonné, 'Conditions and Problems in the Agriculture of Iraq', *Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Sociology* (International Institute of Agriculture, Rome), February 1934, p. 53–E.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East . . .
Iraq MHI

242 being conducted this year with about nine different insecticides, but a more thorough program is needed.

The FAO is supplying a specialized cotton entomologist, and the Point Four Mission is supplying a general entomologist to help develop an effective program.

654 The country has a law requiring that all cotton stalks must be destroyed, the debris burned, and the land ploughed by the first of January. In fact, the farmer is not given permission to plant cotton again unless he has complied with these regulations. Seed sterilization also is required. But the Director General himself admits the program has been ineffective. There are many host plants on which cotton insects can live, and the people do not understand the law or are not in a position to comply, especially where they are in the habit of saving the stalks for fuel.

One of the real difficulties is the growth habits of the present Acala varieties which are said to set 80 per cent of their bolls on what is called the second flush, after the end of August, when the insect population is highest. Efforts are being directed toward development of varieties that have a shorter maturing period, and early results with Coker Wilt have been encouraging.

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

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

This irrigation system of a farm in southern Iraq dates back to Biblical times. Mules walk down an inclined track beside the well pulling the goatskin water scoops. The scoops, hauled to ground level by the mules, spill their contents into the irrigation ditch. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Government of Iraq in its extensive projects to modernize and improve irrigation and increase crop output.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 Ml Middle East
Iraq MHI

242 134 for centuries, and farmers have depended on the silt deposited from the overflows to maintain the fertility. Increased use of canals and dams for irrigation has made the overflows less frequent. Experiments conducted for the past three or four years with commercial fertilisers have shown no significant benefit, but the United States experts feel the tests are not conclusive and should be continued with various soil conditioners.

While depending on basic research to stimulate long-range production, the Director General is trying to force an immediate improvement through regulations requiring the application of techniques known to be beneficial.

248 656 *Controls*

In an effort to concentrate cotton production on the better suited lands and to facilitate insect control, seed control, and other beneficial measures, regulations have been promulgated requiring government permits for all cotton acreage planted. These permits, based primarily on suitability of the soil and availability of water and labor, are issued on the recommendation of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the enforcement system is inadequate, and it is generally admitted that the regulation is not closely followed, especially in areas where the local sheiks are extremely powerful and are practically a law unto themselves.

654 242 407

—Photo Courtesy of Technical Cooperation Administration

At the government cotton experimental farm near Baghdad a double-handled board is used to level the high spots in a newly ploughed field. Outside the government farms little leveling is done. Through the Point Four Program the United States is cooperating with the Iraq Government in experiments and demonstrations to improve cotton cultural practices.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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COTTON IN IRAQ

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

The Ministry also has a program under which pure seed imported from the United States and those propagated on the state farms are distributed free of charge to farmers who have received planting permits and who agree to the variety control. Under this program the government proposes to distribute enough seed to plant most of the area annually for the next five years. Despite this incentive, widespread evasion also is reported. Apparently the farmers still rely on the mixed seed on the theory that if one does not produce another will. (Seed distribution in 1952 was considerably less than in 1951 because of the bad crop last season.) 248 656

The government also has established supervision over all the gins for control of seed distribution to prevent any except approved seed from going back to the farms for planting. Here again enforcement is said to be inadequate.

The mandatory insect control program is another illustration of the effort to force an improvement in cotton, and here again the results have been questionable. 242

The Director General is thinking also of establishing a price stabilization program to lend further encouragement to the promotional programs, but this has not been approved as yet.

29:Dunn S-4 (1952)1952 MI Middle East
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Even the government recognizes the difficulty of enforcing these rather drastic measures in a short period of time against the tradition of complete freedom of action by the landowners. The most significant fact is not that they have not been completely successful in the first few years, but that the measures have been adopted by the government. The trend definitely is toward tighter and tighter control by the government. The outcome likely will depend on how readily the big landlords accept the regimentation and cooperate. If the landlords become convinced that the regulations are to their ultimate economic advantage, they may comply willingly. So in the end the controls may depend on the educational program.

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 MI Middle East
Iraq MHI

Chapter 13

PRIVATE AND FOREIGN SCHOOLS

TWO TYPES of schools function outside the government system: private schools, which are owned and operated by Iraqi citizens, either individual or in association; and foreign schools, which are owned and operated by foreign individuals or groups. Since Iraqi parents are forbidden by law to send their children to foreign primary schools, there are no foreign schools below the intermediate level in Iraq, with the exception of 5 primary schools for Iranian boys. Table 35 presents enrollment figures for all types of primary and seconday schools in Iraq as of 1945–46.

Both private and foreign schools are obliged to conform to governmental regulations and to have governmental approval of housing, qualifications of teachers, curriculums, and textbooks. They must follow the government's courses of study for Arabic language and social studies, and teachers of these subjects are appointed by the Ministry of Education. Admission to the first and fourth years of secondary schools is conditional upon having passed the public primary- and intermediate-school examinations.

Curriculums for both private and foreign schools follow those of the government schools so that pupils will not be handicapped in the public examinations. Since all foreign secondary schools are American, English is emphasized, and in the last two years of the course some subjects are taught in that language. The private schools for Jews teach Hebrew language and literature in the primary sections and English and French language and literature in the secondary schools. The better students in the Jewish schools are prepared to take the examinations for French certificates, as are pupils in the schools which were founded as French missionary schools.

Private schools fall into three categories: private ventures, schools maintained by associations interested in raising the standard of national culture, and sectarian schools. The private ventures are conducted for profit and appeal especially to pupils who do not find places in the government schools. Associations that maintain schools are usually composed of citizens

312 to the irrigation department, and the procedure to be followed
681 for their recovery though covered by Article 19 is now done
694 through the Mutassarrifs concerned in accordance with the Law for the Collection of Debts Due to the Government No. 43 of 23 April 1931 as amended by subsequent Laws.

5) Rice Cultivation

243 The Law for Rice Cultivation No. 23 of 31 March 1932, as
656 subsequently amended by Law 53 of 15 May 1940, prohibits or restricts in areas defined by Regulation issued from time to time, the cultivation of rice for health reasons, economy in the use of water or soil conservation (Article 1).

Rice cultivation could only be conducted under special license (Article 4), and areas in which rice cultivation is restricted shall be fixed by Regulation (Article 2).

Regulation No. 34 of 28 August 1944, defines the regions in which rice cultivation is prohibited and also fixes areas in mashares for regions where rice could be cultivated.

The Minister of Agriculture shall decide the manner in which areas for rice cultivation alloted to each Liwa are to be distributed, and the mutassarrif concerned shall issue a notice inviting those interested to apply for the necessary permits.

Requests must be submitted to the qusiamaqam of the qadha in which the lands are situated, and the mutassarrif, to whom the requests are transferred shall issue the permits, with the requirements of the Irrigation Department. The minimum distance between rice fields and inhabited localities shall be three kilometres. The permits are non-transferable and are strictly limited to the persons and to the plot of land and irrigation works stated on them. The permit holder agrees to the rotation of water supplies determined by the Irrigation Department, and he accepts responsibility for all shortage of irrigation supply with consequent damage to crops.

6) Offences and Penalties under the Law for Rice Cultivation

243 It is forbidden for any person to exceed the area for rice
681 cultivation fixed in the permits, or to cultivate without permit in prohibited and restricted areas. Contraveners shall be fined

4: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MAI Iran
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the Kurdish tribal system poses some unusual problems in this field. 621
In the travel literature, Kurdish tribes have a deserved reputation as [181]
warriors and bandits with little respect for human life, and without
further analysis of the situation it has been assumed that much of
their activities in this field is governed by a pattern of blood feuding.
There is however good reason to analyse the situation more carefully,
to discover just what patterns relating to homicide do in fact exist.

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The material on which the following is based is, for obvious 629
reasons, very incomplete. Today homicide is the matter with which I
the external administration is most concerned, and immediate inter- 656
vention on its part tends to prevent other action from being taken, 682
or fear of such intervention prevents actual case histories from
being discussed. All the data that I do have, however, indicates the
absence or very weak development of blood feuding patterns in
Southern Kurdistan. This absence may seem surprising, and it is
necessary to make clear just what is meant by the statement.

K
It seems useful in the analysis of this phenomenon to adhere to a 628
fairly specific defintion of what is meant by institutionalized blood
feud. In its most characteristic form, it has been described in nume-
rous African societies, e. g. the Nuba (Nadel 1947): «In Heiban
[homicide] entails blood feud, which is carried on until exact revenge
has been achieved; a man must be killed for a man, a woman for a
woman; even in their age the two must be as closely matched as
possible. The duty to avenge devolves, not on an individual, but on
the whole clan . . . . Again, the revenge is not directed against an
individual — the murderer himself — but against any member of
the enemy clan who satisfies the conditions of this law of rev-
enge . . .», p. 151). The pattern is thus a special form of institution-
alized revenge, whereby a whole group of persons is held collectively
responsible for the behavior of one of its members, and where the
wronged party is similarly not conceived as the individual or his
close family, but as the whole larger group to which he belonged.
The reaction is one of retaliation, governed by considerations of
equality, and subsidiarily one of compensation by traditionally stipu-
lated blood money (e. g. ibid. p. 251).

In this form, the blood feud is not found in Southern Kurdistan.